1-2 Some Recent Accounts of Group Belief

(A) #summative_account: When we attribute a belief to a group we are really just saying that all or most of the group members believe this. The truth of these ascriptions, then, rests on whether or not all or most of the members believe whatever we have attributed to the group.

Anthony Quinton in “Social objects” (1976):

To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members. With such mental states as belief and attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called a summative kind.

We might formalize the #summative_account account in the following way, where “p” stand for a proposition: Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members of G believe that p.

**problem But imagine a case where each individual believes that p but no member knows that other members have such a belief.

summative account needs a condition that specifies that members know of the existence of others' beliefs. There must be “common knowledge” among the members: members of the group must be aware that the belief is shared and that this awareness itself is manifest to all.

If we add common knowledge to the summative account, then we have something like the following:

Group G believes that p if and only if all or most of the members of G believe that p, under conditions of common knowledge.

Now there are certain cases that the summative account seems to fit:

#distributive_belief vs #non-distributive_belief

Americans believe that Mojitos are delicious. Such an ascription is purely #distributive_belief: delicious to all or most Americans. The summative account seems to make sense of this sort of ascription quite well.

But there are cases where ascriptions are #non-distributive_belief. Attributions of beliefs to groups such as committees, boards, corporations, and teams are often such cases

Reasons to be skeptical about the adequacy of summative accounts for #non-distributive_belief

1- Seems a bit too strong to require that all or most of the members of a group believe that p. Imagine a hiring committee of ten people that issues the following statement through its committee chair:

We believe candidate X is the most qualified candidate.

Suppose only two members believe that candidate X is the most qualified. The rest of the committee either doesn't believe it or doesn't have a view of the matter at all – perhaps they didn't do any work and just went along with others.

**too strong: *All the committee's actions up to that point and going forward suggest that it believes candidate X to be the best candidate, and yet not all of the members believe this to be so.

**2- no individual believes that p but the attribution of a group belief that p is appropriate

*Consider: a conservative committee is attributed the belief that marriage, as the union of one man and one woman, must be upheld as the national standard. Suppose we found out that no member of this committee actually believes that heterosexual marriage must be upheld as the national standard. We can suppose that some of them believe the opposite but are afraid to lose their position in the party and that some of them believe that heterosexual marriage should be the standard in their own lives but don't believe it should be the national standard. If we found this out, would we claim that the attribution is false?

whether the committee believes this or not depends a great deal (but perhaps not exclusively) on how the committee acts and what it does. Suppose, despite the individual members' personal beliefs, the committee continues to issue statements that express and reaffirm this “core value.” It adds the core value to policy statements, implements education policies around it, and, when in public, members affirm that heterosexual marriage should be upheld as the national standard.

Now one might balk at such an example and insist that the group will behave this way precisely because at least one person believes the proposition attributed to the group, and he or she is perhaps pulling the strings. This may in fact happen, but the point of the example is to show that it is conceptually possible for there to be a case where no individual believes that p but the attribution of a group belief that p is appropriate.

3- summative accounts fail to provide sufficient conditions for group belief

Margaret Gilbert provides the following example to motivate this criticism:

Assume there are two committees – say, the Library Committee and the Food Committee of a residential college – with the same members. without contradiction, (a) most members of the Library Committee personally believe that college members have to consume too much starch, and this is common knowledge within the Library Committee; (b) the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the members of the Food Committee ; (c) the Food Committee believes that college members have to consume too much starch, whereas the Library Committee has no opinion on the matter.

It seems that one can infer that according to our intuitive conceptions it is not logically sufficient for a group belief that p either that most group members believe that p, or that there be common knowledge within the group that most members believe that p.

Summative accounts don't quite capture what is going on in many cases of group belief ascription. we want to show that belief plays a role within the life of the group, within its deliberations.

Consider a case in which every member of the philosophy department believes that smoking causes cancer. This belief is held in common, and it may even be that each faculty member believes that every other faculty member believes that smoking causes cancer. It would be unusual, however, to ascribe such a belief to the department. The belief plays no role in the life of the department as a group – it does not enter deliberations or planning, and it doesn't influence the actions of the department or the actions of the faculty qua faculty.

The summative account, then, doesn't really provide us with an account of group belief at all. It provides us with an account of shared belief or commonly held belief

(B) #acceptance_account : Acceptance accounts attempt to provide an account of group belief in terms of individual members' acceptance of a proposition.

a group, such as a corporation, believes something if and only if there are members within the organization who have a special position and decision-making role and those folks accept together (or jointly accept) that proposition as the view of the group. These folks know that there is such acceptance in place by all others, and the non-operative members – the poor guys on the assembly line, for instance – tacitly accept that this proposition is the view of the group.

(Belief of Group) G believes that p in the social and normative circumstances C if and only if in C there are operative members A1 … Am in G with respective positions P1 … Pm such that:

1. (1) the agents A1 to An they are performing their social tasks in their positions P1 to Pn, and due to their exercising the relevant authority system in G, (intentionally) jointly accept p as the view of G, and because of this exercise of the authority system they ought to continue to accept or positionally believe that p;

2. (2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the effect that (1);

3. (3) because of (1) the full-fledged and adequately informed non-operative members of G tend to tacitly accept – or at least ought to accept – p as members of G;

4. (4) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3). (1995, p. 295)

This account relies heavily on a distinction between #operative_members and #non-operative_members, acceptance and belief, and the notion of correct social and normative circumstances. Let's consider each of these features in turn.

#operative_members those who are responsible for the group belief having the content that it does. In the case of a corporation, the board of directors... those who work on the assembly line or in the credit department, for instance, are non-operative members. Which members are operative is determined by the rules and regulations of the corporation.

The relevant social and normative circumstances involve tasks, social roles, and rules – either formal (resembling laws or statutes) or informal (based on informal group agreements).

#Summative_accounts require that all or some of the members believe that p in order for the group to believe that p. As we have seen, this seems too strong. Tuomela attempts to avoid this problem by requiring that operative members merely accept that p. No member actually has to believe that p.

The operative members have what Tuomela calls “positional beliefs.” Positional beliefs are views a position-holder has accepted as a basis for his performance of certain kinds of social tasks and are different from personal beliefs. For instance, the CEO might personally believe that it is wrong for the company to fire 10,000 employees...Positional views (he accepts the proposition of position and acts on it), need not be truth-related.

Tuomela's account has a number of merits.

First, it avoids the pitfalls of the summative account. We have a theory of how the ascription to a group could be not merely an account of commonly held beliefs. Second, it takes into account the fact that in certain groups there are various roles, rules, and responsibilities. Not every group member will play a role in realizing the group's belief.

A number of concerns:

First, consider, again, condition (1): The operative members must intentionally jointly accept p as the view of the group, where joint acceptance simply means that each operative member accepts p as the view of the group and it is common knowledge that each operative member does so.

But what are we to make of the reference to “the view of the group”? Prima facie, what it is to have a view on some issue is to have an opinion or a belief. The “view” of the group, then, seems to be simply the belief of the group

Tuomela's analysis appears to be circular. For Tuomela, there is a group belief that p if and only if operative members accept p as the group belief. But group belief (the view of the group rather than the view of its individual members) is the concept the analysis is supposed to illuminate by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. Tuomela may have provided an account of how group beliefs are formed but he hasn't really told us what a group view or belief is.

*Second: Eliminativism about group belief

On his account, group belief is merely joint acceptance of a proposition. Why talk of group beliefs at all? This is an unhappy result, especially when we are confronted with our practice of epistemically appraising groups. We attribute knowledge and belief to groups in the context of epistemic and moral appraisal. But such appraisal presupposes belief.

Consider the case of lying. When we accuse another person of lying to us, we accuse the person of misrepresenting the facts – facts they themselves believe to be otherwise. Lying presupposes belief.

An example: Tobacco industry and ads -The advertisement claimed that there was no evidence linking cigarette smoking and cancer and that the industry believed that there was no reason to think that tobacco products were harmful to one's health. That meeting, according to lawsuits filed in federal and state courts across the United States, began a decades-long campaign to deceive the public about the health risks of smoking. The tobacco industry lied

It didn't just accept this for the sake of argument. But, on Tuomela's view, it could be possible for no one in the industry or the industry itself to believe that cigarettes caused cancer. But without belief there is no lie.

There is a sort of normativity involved in group belief (and other group attitudes such as group intention) that needs to be captured and isn't captured by the summative or acceptance views.

Example: Imagine an academic meeting when one person shockingly disagrees (entrance exam is so easy my child can pass it) the Chair of the department are likely to respond in a less than positive way. They might say to Professor Troublemaker, “We agreed that it was the best method! Why are you doing this?

According to Margaret Gilbert (1994), a “shocked rebuke” will be a very normal response to this sort of behavior that moves away from the commitment of the group. she thinks her account of group belief best accounts for this phenomenon. The obligations and entitlements that arise from this commitment justify the shocked rebuke.

The commitment is of a very special kind, According to Gilbert, who calls this a #joint_commitment, paradigmatic social groups are constituted by one or more joint commitments. When they are so constituted they become “plural subjects,” to which actions and intentional states may be ascribed.

In the case of belief, groups become the plural subject of a belief by forming a joint commitment to believe as a body. What is a #joint_commitment and what does it mean to #believe_as_a_body”

Distinctions: #personal_commitment vs #joint_commitment

#personal_commitment : commitments we can make by ourselves and can rescind on our own.

When I decide to write a book I have a reason to pursue certain courses of action rather than others, and if I fail to pursue actions conducive to writing a book I could be charged with irrationality if there are no overriding reasons that would explain my choice of action

#joint_commitment : commitments made by two or more people and cannot be rescinded unilaterally. Just as individual decisions do, joint commitments rationalize action. When one becomes party to a joint commitment it gives one reason to act in a certain way, and if one doesn't one is susceptible to charges of irrationality and, in addition, rebuke from other parties.

Consider again the academic committee and the chock reaction If Professor Troublemaker says something opposite the group's belief, then the others are justified in rebuking her. Professor Troublemaker can't just change the group belief on her own. Their joint commitment brings with it certain obligations and entitlements. The obligations involved in joint commitments are not, according to Gilbert, moral obligations but a function of the fact that the parties have together imposed rationally constraining commitments on each other.

Like personal commitments, joint commitments involve the norms of practical rationality.

how are joint commitments formed?

When each individual expresses their readiness or willingness jointly to commit them all to X as a body (again where X stands for an action or mental state) under conditions of common knowledge. This set of expressions of readiness suffices jointly to commit them all, and the relevant obligations and entitlements then come into play (readiness can be implicit...even nodding head to say yes).

Remember the example: The members of the program assessment committee need not have all said, “I express my willingness to commit to believing as a body that the California Critical Thinking Skills test is a suitable assessment tool.” The fact that no one objected strongly to its use can, according to Gilbert, constitute a readiness to be jointly committed with the others. Once a joint commitment is formed, each individual is committed (though not via a personal commitment) to doing certain things.

#believe_as_a_body :“The members are jointly committed to emulate, by virtue of their combined actions and utterances, a single believer of the proposition in question”

Gilbert makes it clear that members themselves do not have to believe that p in order to achieve this. This allows her to avoid the pitfalls of the summative accounts. Neither do the members have to act as if they personally believe that p.

in the context of a group belief, then, seems to involve at least not saying anything contrary to the group belief while speaking as a member of the group or acting contrary to the group belief while acting in one's capacity as a group member. One who participates in a joint commitment to believe that p thereby accepts an obligation to do what he can to bring it about that any joint endeavors among the members of S be conducted on the assumption that p is true. He is entitled to expect others' support in bringing this about. Further, if one does believe something that is inconsistent with p, one is required at least not to express that belief baldly. The committee members would have a right to rebuke one of their own if, in acting as a member of the committee, that person expressed views that were contrary to the group view without prefacing their remarks by stating, “I personally believe that …”

what is the difference between Tuomela's acceptance account and Gilbert's commitment account?

willingness or readiness to be jointly committed to believing as a body that p looks very close to accepting p as the view of the group, which is basically the acceptance account

For Gilbert, however, the expression of willingness to be jointly committed is a precursor to the setting up of a pool of wills. Once each member expresses his or her willingness, something new comes into being – a joint commitment.

Unlike the acceptance view, Gilbert's joint commitment view does not reduce to an individual commitment or acceptance. Whatever the individuals are committed to in a joint commitment is derivative of the joint commitment. This allows Gilbert to avoid worries about eliminativism that plague Tuomela's account. We cannot eliminate the notion of joint commitment because it cannot be reduced to individual commitments or acceptances --the notion of acceptance does not provide the normativity Gilbert thinks is part and parcel of the social world. It is from the joint commitment that obligations and entitlements flow, and this is unique to her account.

The framework of joint commitment has been used to offer joint commitment account of group intention as well.

A number of concerns again Gilbert and #commitment_account

Consider, again, our tobacco company. Is it necessary that each member of the tobacco company express their willingness to be jointly committed ? This seems too demanding. Gilbert's theory doesn't seem to fit large-scale groups such as corporations, where members often leave but both the organization and its beliefs remain the same. On Gilbert's account, members must intentionally express their willingness to be jointly committed with the others. However, in larger groups or groups that do not engage in a joint discussion about the group's view but hold a vote, one that is private so that members cannot know how the others voted, there is no way to know the intentions of the other participants (Baltzer, 2002).

Gilbert has responded to this criticism by saying that her account provides the core notion of a group belief. Other cases of group belief will be extensions of this core. The beliefs of large-scale groups or corporations, for instance, can be explained by members allowing certain people to form the group's beliefs – a prior joint commitment to allow certain members to form, via further joint commitments, the group's beliefs.

**Why an irreducible normative element?

Gilbert's appeal to an irreducible normative element has also been criticized. Critics (Bratman 2007, 2014; Bittner 2002) have argued that she introduces an apparatus to explain a type of normativity that either isn't there or doesn't need to be explained by a new apparatus. Why appeal to a technical notion such as joint commitment when one could appeal to a general principle of fidelity? A principle of fidelity such as “Do what you say you will do” will ensure that, once each individual expresses their willingness to act as a body, various expectations and obligations will be set up.

Consider again the academic assessment committee. Professor Troublemaker might best be understood as violating Gricean norms of conversation. Professor Troublemaker is going in the wrong direction! If the norms involved in these cases can be understood in terms of conversational norms, then why introduce a new apparatus to do so?

one merit for #commitment_account as Gilbert gives it: seems to acknowledge groups as the bearer of mental states

She argues that the notion of a joint commitment is a primitive one and that members of a group will have an intuitive idea of what it is to be jointly committed to believing as a group, but what we want from a theory of group belief is an account of why group belief is belief-like. As with Tuomela's acceptance account, we seem to have an account of how group beliefs are realized or formed (via joint commitments) but no account of why group beliefs should be counted as beliefs at all.

Gilbert hasn't remained entirely silent on this issue

Let me now say a word more on the analogy between group beliefs and the beliefs of individuals. Both of these “phenomena of belief” may be seen as essentially involving a relation between a proposition and a subject … The proposition figures in the life of the group or in the life of the individual. In picking out belief, then, we may not primarily be concerned to pick out a special state of mind, so much as picking out a certain proposition as one which has an explanatory role to play in an account of the behavior of individuals on the one hand and sets of individuals on the other … If we look at things this way the analogy between group belief and individual belief may seem, after all, to be quite close.

It is this very insight that motivates my own positive proposal, developed in Chapter 5